The brain can be thought of as a tool.

In this paper I argue that the recent tendency to elevate neuropsychology to the status of the one true scientific core of studies of people thinking, feeling, acting and perceiving is not best understood as a simple mereological fallacy, that is the fallacy of ascribing certain properties of wholes to their parts, in particular mental concepts to the material brain as a part of a person. In defending Svend Brinkmann's way of undermining the claims of neuroscience against the criticism offered by Gaeto and Cornejo of the cognitive task-brain as tool proposal, I argue that a person's brain is part of the body of that person, but that the body is not a part of a person. Hence the use of person-concepts to describe brain activity is not a mereological fallacy. Rather human bodies are sites for people. Material tools can be fashioned or found at such sites. It is a fallacy to present neuroscience as the core of psychology but it is the error of deriving an `ought' from an 'is' as identified by David Hume. Where to look for a positive guide to a philosophically respectable psychology, that is a study program that does justice to the phenomena of human thinking, feeling, acting and perceiving, without falling into logical and semantic traps. I show how to adapt Aristotle's schema for 'complete explanation' to this role.