Literature DB >> 22309723

Toward a phenomenology of feelings.

Christopher L Heavey1, Russell T Hurlburt, Noelle L Lefforge.   

Abstract

Our understanding of emotion cannot be complete without an understanding of feelings, the experiential aspect of emotion. Despite their importance, little effort has been devoted to the careful apprehension of feelings. Based on our apprehension of many randomly selected moments of pristine inner experience, we present a preliminary phenomenology of feelings. We begin by observing that often feelings occur as directly experienced phenomena of awareness; however, often no feelings are present in experience, or if they are present, they are too faint to be observed by a process intended to observe them. Feelings range from vague to distinct and sometimes do, but other times do not, include bodily sensations. When bodily sensations are present, there is a wide range of clarity and location of these sensations. Sometimes people experience multiple distinct feelings and sometimes people experience one feeling that is a mix or blend of different feelings. We also discuss what feelings are not, including instances when feelings do not appear to be present, despite evidence suggesting the presence of underlying emotional processes (e.g., behavioral evidence of emotion). These instances of emotion but not feeling lead us to speculate that experiencing feelings is a skill developed over time through an interaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal events.

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Year:  2012        PMID: 22309723     DOI: 10.1037/a0026905

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Emotion        ISSN: 1528-3542


  6 in total

1.  Inner experience in the scanner: can high fidelity apprehensions of inner experience be integrated with fMRI?

Authors:  Simone Kühn; Charles Fernyhough; Benjamin Alderson-Day; Russell T Hurlburt
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2014-12-09

2.  Pristine Inner Experience and Descriptive Experience Sampling: Implications for Psychology.

Authors:  Leiszle R Lapping-Carr; Christopher L Heavey
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2017-12-12

3.  Response: Commentary: Can Inner Experience Be Apprehended in High Fidelity? Examining Brain Activation and Experience from Multiple Perspectives.

Authors:  Russell T Hurlburt; Ben Alderson-Day; Charles Fernyhough; Simone Kühn
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2017-04-25

4.  Commentary: Can Inner Experience Be Apprehended in High Fidelity? Examining Brain Activation and Experience from Multiple Perspectives.

Authors:  Stuart J McKelvie
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2018-08-03

5.  What goes on in the resting-state? A qualitative glimpse into resting-state experience in the scanner.

Authors:  Russell T Hurlburt; Ben Alderson-Day; Charles Fernyhough; Simone Kühn
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2015-10-08

6.  Measuring the Frequency of Inner-Experience Characteristics by Self-Report: The Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire.

Authors:  Christopher L Heavey; Stefanie A Moynihan; Vincent P Brouwers; Leiszle Lapping-Carr; Alek E Krumm; Jason M Kelsey; Dio K Turner; Russell T Hurlburt
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2019-01-11
  6 in total

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