Literature DB >> 21058830

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

William V Fabricius1, Ty W Boyer, Amy A Weimer, Kathleen Carroll.   

Abstract

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.

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Mesh:

Year:  2010        PMID: 21058830     DOI: 10.1037/a0017648

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Dev Psychol        ISSN: 0012-1649


  8 in total

1.  Do non-human primates really represent others' ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis.

Authors:  Daniel J Horschler; Laurie R Santos; Evan L MacLean
Journal:  Cognition       Date:  2019-04-24

2.  Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind.

Authors:  William V Fabricius; Christopher R Gonzales; Annelise Pesch; Amy A Weimer; John Pugliese; Kathleen Carroll; Rebecca R Bolnick; Anne S Kupfer; Nancy Eisenberg; Tracy L Spinrad
Journal:  Monogr Soc Res Child Dev       Date:  2021-09

3.  How do children overcome their pragmatic performance problems in the true belief task? The role of advanced pragmatics and higher-order theory of mind.

Authors:  Lydia Paulin Schidelko; Marina Proft; Hannes Rakoczy
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2022-04-27       Impact factor: 3.752

4.  The Development of Understanding Opacity in Preschoolers: A Transition From a Coarse- to Fine-Grained Understanding of Beliefs.

Authors:  Arkadiusz Gut; Maciej Haman; Oleg Gorbaniuk; Monika Chylińskia
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2020-04-07

5.  Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge.

Authors:  Siba Ghrear; Adam Baimel; Taeh Haddock; Susan A J Birch
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2021-02-19       Impact factor: 3.240

6.  Why Do Children Who Solve False Belief Tasks Begin to Find True Belief Control Tasks Difficult? A Test of Pragmatic Performance Factors in Theory of Mind Tasks.

Authors:  Lydia P Schidelko; Michael Huemer; Lara M Schröder; Anna S Lueb; Josef Perner; Hannes Rakoczy
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2022-01-14

7.  Expanding the understanding of majority-bias in children's social learning.

Authors:  Anne Sibilsky; Heidi Colleran; Richard McElreath; Daniel B M Haun
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2022-04-25       Impact factor: 4.996

8.  Do young children track other's beliefs, or merely their perceptual access? An interactive, anticipatory measure of early theory of mind.

Authors:  Pamela Barone; Lisa Wenzel; Marina Proft; Hannes Rakoczy
Journal:  R Soc Open Sci       Date:  2022-10-05       Impact factor: 3.653

  8 in total

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