Thoughts versus deeds: distal and proximal intent in lay judgments of moral responsibility.

The authors propose that two central ingredients in lay models of intentionality are (a) "distal intent" (the actor's mind is focused on a broader goal) and (b) "proximal intent" (the actor's mind is focused narrowly on the act itself). Study 1 established that participants rate an actor with both forms of intent more responsible than an actor with only one form of intent or neither form of intent. In Study 2, when the actor had only distal intent, participants with a high-level construal rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low-level construal. In Study 3, when the actor had only distal intent, participants primed with psychodynamic concepts rated the actor more responsible than did those primed with cognitive-control concepts. However, when the actor had only proximal intent, the effect reversed. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on moral reasoning and law.