| Literature DB >> 18947429 |
Bjørn G Iversen1, Bjørn Hofmann, Preben Aavitsland.
Abstract
In 2002, Norway experienced a large outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections in hospitals with 231 confirmed cases. This fuelled intense public and professional debates on what were the causes and who were responsible. In epidemiology, other sciences, in philosophy and in law there is a long tradition of discussing the concept of causality. We use this outbreak as a case; apply various theories of causality from different disciplines to discuss the roles and responsibilities of some of the parties involved. Mackie's concept of INUS conditions, Hill's nine viewpoints to study association for claiming causation, deterministic and probabilistic ways of reasoning, all shed light on the issues of causality in this outbreak. Moreover, applying legal theories of causation (counterfactual reasoning and the "but-for" test and the NESS test) proved especially useful, but the case also illustrated the weaknesses of the various theories of causation.We conclude that many factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that contamination of a medical device in the production facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of the medical device in hospitals contributed primarily to the size of the outbreak. The unintended error by its producer--and to a minor extent by the hospital practice--was mainly due to non-application of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to constitute professional negligence. Due to criminal procedure laws and other factors outside the discourse of causality, no one was criminally charged for the outbreak which caused much suffering and shortening the life of at least 34 people.Entities:
Year: 2008 PMID: 18947429 PMCID: PMC2585074 DOI: 10.1186/1742-7622-5-22
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Emerg Themes Epidemiol ISSN: 1742-7622
Figure 1The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab.
Figure 2The direction of flow of the Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria from the production to the patients.
Application of Hill's viewpoints on the causal association between the Dent-O-Sept swab and becoming colonised or infected during the outbreak
| Hill's viewpoints | Application on the Dent-O-Sept outbreak |
| 1. Strength of association | Strong. |
| Association for having used the swab during hospitalisation and having the outbreak strain of | |
| Detecting genotypically identical strains of the bacterium in patients, the product and in the production facility [ | |
| 2. Consistency of association | Yes, to a large extent. |
| However, other co-factors also needed to be in place, e.g. contamination of the particular swab and a susceptible patient. Due to secondary spread in the hospitals also patients who did not use the swab were infected. | |
| 3. Specificity of association | Yes, mostly. |
| Use of contaminated swabs led to colonisation and some times to infection. Necessary co-factors were as above (2). The clinical manifestations of the | |
| 4. Temporal sequence of association | Yes. |
| However, the outbreak strain of the bacteria was found in six patients before the production of the first contaminated batch of swabs was detected [ | |
| When the swabs were withdrawn from the marked the number of cases gradually diminished and disappeared. | |
| 5. Biological gradient | This was not tested but assumed. Reuse of the swabs may have increased the bacterial load and hence the risk of becoming infected. |
| 6. Plausibility of association | Yes. |
| The chain from contamination during production to infection is well described. | |
| 7. Coherence of association | Yes. |
| There is no other hypothesis of explanations for the outbreak. | |
| 8. Experiment (reversibility) | Yes, a natural experiment. |
| When the source was removed the number of cases gradually diminished to zero. | |
| 9. Analogy | Yes. |
| There are many other outbreaks caused by medical devices. (References in [ |
The main participants in the Dent-O-Sept outbreak and some of their roles, responsibilities and actions.
| The producer | • Produced the Dent-O-Sept swab |
| • Did not adhere to the laws and regulations for production of medical devices | |
| • Lacked a quality assurance system for the production | |
| • Did not implement advise after external evaluation | |
| • Stopped the swab production as soon as the connection with the outbreak was established | |
| The water supplier | • Supplied drinking water to the producer |
| • The | |
| The hospitals | • Treated patients and procured medical devices |
| • Many lacked quality assured systems for procurement, storage and use of medical devices | |
| • Many lacked systems for training of health care workers | |
| • Many had inadequate reporting systems for faulty medical devices | |
| The health care workers | • Treated and cared for patients |
| • Many reused the "single use" swabs contrary to the text on the wrap | |
| • Many did not report faulty medical devices | |
| The patients | • Received medical treatment and care |
| • Many were seriously ill and susceptible for contracting infections with the | |
| The surveyor and investigator | • Responsible for surveillance of infectious diseases and for outbreak investigations |
| • There is no national surveillance system for | |
| National administrative body | • Responsible for national administration within certain areas of the health care system |
| • Responsible for the audit of the producer | |
| • Ignored the deadline to appeal the police's decision not to press charges. | |