Literature DB >> 18331726

When can we say 'if'?

Jonathan St B T Evans1, Helen Neilens, Simon J Handley, David E Over.   

Abstract

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.

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Year:  2008        PMID: 18331726     DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.001

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Cognition        ISSN: 0010-0277


  2 in total

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Authors:  Matthew Haigh; Jeffrey S Wood; Andrew J Stewart
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2016-07

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Authors:  Gregory R Maio; Ulrike Hahn; John-Mark Frost; Toon Kuppens; Nadia Rehman; Shanmukh Kamble
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2014-08-07
  2 in total

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