| Literature DB >> 17333490 |
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of Schadenfreude--the pleasure felt at another's misfortune--and to argue that feeling it in the course of health care work, as elsewhere, is evidence of a deficient character. In order to show that Schadenfreude is an objectionable emotion in health care work, I first offer some conceptual remarks about emotions generally and their differential treatment in Kantian and Aristotelian thought. Second, I argue that an appreciation of the rationality of the emotions is crucial to our self-understanding as persons in general and nurses in particular. Third, I present a critique of Portmann's (2000, When Bad Things Happen to Other People. London: Routledge) defence of Schadenfreude with examples from both nursing and medical scenarios. Specifically, I show how his exculpation of the emotion in terms of low self-esteem and a commitment to justice are not compelling. I argue that we are active in the construction of our emotional experiences of Schadenfreude, how we may indeed 'nurse' the emotion, and thus become culpable for them in ethical terms.Entities:
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Year: 2007 PMID: 17333490 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-007-9051-9
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Med Health Care Philos ISSN: 1386-7423