Literature DB >> 16885144

Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations.

Wim De Neys1.   

Abstract

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).

Entities:  

Mesh:

Year:  2006        PMID: 16885144     DOI: 10.1080/02724980543000123

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Q J Exp Psychol (Hove)        ISSN: 1747-0218            Impact factor:   2.143


  18 in total

1.  Recruitment of intuitive versus analytic thinking strategies affects the role of working memory in a gambling task.

Authors:  Marta Gozzi; Paolo Cherubini; Costanza Papagno; Emanuela Bricolo
Journal:  Psychol Res       Date:  2010-08-10

2.  How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability.

Authors:  Aidan Feeney
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2007-10

3.  In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making.

Authors:  Carissa Bonner; Ben R Newell
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2010-03

4.  Reasoning with base rates is routine, relatively effortless, and context dependent.

Authors:  Gordon Pennycook; Valerie A Thompson
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2012-06

5.  Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics.

Authors:  Gordon Pennycook; James Allan Cheyne; Derek J Koehler; Jonathan A Fugelsang
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2013-08

6.  The neural substrate of positive bias in spontaneous emotional processing.

Authors:  Roberto Viviani; Hanna Lo; Eun-Jin Sim; Petra Beschoner; Julia C Stingl; Andrea B Horn
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2010-11-08       Impact factor: 3.240

7.  Does ambiguity aversion influence the framing effect during decision making?

Authors:  Anaïs Osmont; Mathieu Cassotti; Marine Agogué; Olivier Houdé; Sylvain Moutier
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2015-04

8.  The multifold relationship between memory and decision making: an individual-differences study.

Authors:  Fabio Del Missier; Timo Mäntylä; Patrik Hansson; Wändi Bruine de Bruin; Andrew M Parker; Lars-Göran Nilsson
Journal:  J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn       Date:  2013-04-08       Impact factor: 3.051

9.  Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

Authors:  Yong Lu
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2015-02-06

10.  Detecting cheaters without thinking: testing the automaticity of the cheater detection module.

Authors:  Jens Van Lier; Russell Revlin; Wim De Neys
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2013-01-16       Impact factor: 3.240

View more

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.