| Literature DB >> 15723710 |
Maithili M Jog1, Milind G Watve.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: For parasites with a predator-prey life cycle, the completion of the life cycle often depends on consumption of parasitized prey by the predator. In the case of such parasite species the predator and the parasite have common interests and therefore a mutualistic relationship is possible. Some evidence of a predator-parasite mutualism was reported from spotted deer or chital (Axix axis) as a prey species, dhole or Indian wild-dog (Cuon alpinus) as the predator and a protozoan (Sarcocystis axicuonis) as the parasite. We examine here, with the help of a model, the ecological conditions necessary for the evolution and stability of such a mutualistic relationship. A two - level game theory model was designed in which the payoff of a parasite is decided not only by alternative parasite strategies but also by alternative host strategies and vice versa. Conditions for ESS were examined.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2005 PMID: 15723710 PMCID: PMC554990 DOI: 10.1186/1472-6785-5-3
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Ecol ISSN: 1472-6785 Impact factor: 2.964
Pay – off matrix for predator and parasite strategies.
| parasite | predator | ||||
| Mild | Virulent | Tolerant | Resistant | ||
| parasite | Mild | 1-y | fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x) | m | p* m |
| Virulent | fr(1-x)+(1-fr)(1-y) | (1-x) | v | p* v | |
| predator | Tolerant | -y | -x | z | (1-fr) p *z + fr *z |
| Resistant | - p * y | - p* x | (1-fr)*z + fr (p* z) | p* z | |
The table differs from pay-off matrix tables for classical game theory models. The table accounts for two alternative strategies each for two different types of players namely parasite and predator. The pay-off of the parasite is not only decided by other parasites but also by the predator strategy and vice-versa. Therefore the complete pay-off of a mild parasite invading a virulent population in a tolerant host population is m * [fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x)]. Others to be calculated similarly.