Literature DB >> 15376805

Logical reasoning and probabilities: a comprehensive test of Oaksford And Chater (2001).

Klaus Oberauer1, Andrea Weidenfeld, Robin Hörnig.   

Abstract

We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms.

Mesh:

Year:  2004        PMID: 15376805     DOI: 10.3758/bf03196605

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev        ISSN: 1069-9384


  6 in total

1.  The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning.

Authors:  N Chater; M Oaksford
Journal:  Cogn Psychol       Date:  1999-03       Impact factor: 3.468

2.  Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.

Authors:  M Oaksford; N Chater; J Larkin
Journal:  J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn       Date:  2000-07       Impact factor: 3.051

3.  Data selection and natural sampling: probabilities do matter.

Authors:  Mike Oaksford; Michelle Wakefield
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2003-01

4.  The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.

Authors:  M Oaksford; N Chater
Journal:  Trends Cogn Sci       Date:  2001-08-01       Impact factor: 20.229

5.  Probabilities and utilities of fictional outcomes in Wason's four-card selection task.

Authors:  K N Kirby
Journal:  Cognition       Date:  1994-01

6.  Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task.

Authors:  Simon J Handley; Aidan Feeney; Catherine Harper
Journal:  Q J Exp Psychol A       Date:  2002-07
  6 in total

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