Literature DB >> 15272951

The excluded player in coalition formation.

Ilja van Beest1, Henk Wilke, Eric van Dijk.   

Abstract

Coalition research generally assumes that people strive to maximize their share of the coalition payoff and that they exclude others from joining a coalition if these others are not needed to obtain the coalition payoff. In two experiments, the authors show that this view is too narrow and that willingness to include such others is dependent on the extent to which people feel that exclusion affects the payoff of the excluded player. This finding was moderated by social value orientations. Proselfs were not affected by the consequences for the excluded players. Prosocials were less willing to exclude others the more harmful were the consequences of exclusion. Results are related to research on social exclusion, the do-no-harm principle, and social value orientations. Copyright 2003 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Entities:  

Mesh:

Year:  2003        PMID: 15272951     DOI: 10.1177/0146167202239049

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Pers Soc Psychol Bull        ISSN: 0146-1672


  2 in total

1.  The Online Coalition Game: A tool for online interactive coalition formation research.

Authors:  Joeri Wissink; Ilja van Beest; Tila Pronk; Niels van de Ven
Journal:  Behav Res Methods       Date:  2022-01-24

2.  Strength Is Still a Weakness in Coalition Formation: Replicating and Understanding the Strength-Is-Weakness Effect.

Authors:  Joeri Wissink; Ilja van Beest; Tila Pronk; Niels van de Ven
Journal:  Pers Soc Psychol Bull       Date:  2021-04-13
  2 in total

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.