Establishing remediation levels in response to a radiological dispersal event (or "dirty bomb").

The detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could produce significant social and economic damage, the extent of which would depend largely on how quickly and effectively cleanup levels were established and on public acceptance of those levels. This paper shows that current radiological cleanup laws and regulations, models for converting dose or risk goals to cleanup concentrations, and existing site-specific criteria were not designed specifically for RDD cleanups but, absent changes, would apply by default. The goals and approaches of these legal and methodological structures often conflict; using them in response to terrorism could undermine public confidence, cause delays, and produce unnecessary costs or unacceptable cleanups. RDD cleanups would involve immediate priorities not envisioned in the existing radiological cleanup framework, such as balancing radiation risks with the health, economic, and other societal impacts associated with access to the infrastructure necessary to sustain society (e.g., hospitals, bridges, utilities). To minimize the achievement of terrorism goals, the elements of an RDD cleanup response--including updating existing legal/regulatory structures to clarify federal authority, goals, and methods for developing RDD cleanup criteria--must be in place soon; given the complexity of the issues and the potential societal impact, this effort should be expedited.