| Literature DB >> 15099126 |
Steven Sloman1, Yuval Rottenstreich, Edward Wisniewski, Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Craig R Fox.
Abstract
Probability judgments for packed descriptions of events (e.g., the probability that a businessman does business with a European country) are compared with judgments for unpacked descriptions of the same events (e.g., the probability that a businessman does business with England, France, or some other European country). The prediction that unpacking can decrease probability judgments, derived from the hypothesis that category descriptions are interpreted narrowly in terms of typical instances, is contrasted to the prediction of support theory that unpacking will generally increase judged probabilities (A. Tversky & D. J. Koehler, 1994). The authors varied the typicality of unpacked instances and found no effect of unpacking with typical instances (additivity) and a negative effect with atypical instances (superadditivity). Support theory cannot account for these findings in its current formulation.Mesh:
Year: 2004 PMID: 15099126 DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.3.573
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn ISSN: 0278-7393 Impact factor: 3.051