Literature DB >> 12771070

Identification and containment of an outbreak of SARS in a community hospital.

Hy A Dwosh1, Harry H L Hong, Douglas Austgarden, Stanley Herman, Richard Schabas.   

Abstract

BACKGROUND: Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is continuing to spread around the world. All hospitals must be prepared to care for patients with SARS. Thus, it is important to understand the transmission of this disease in hospitals and to evaluate methods for its containment in health care institutions. We describe how we cared for the first 2 patients with SARS admitted to our 419-bed community hospital in Richmond Hill, Ont., and the response to a SARS outbreak within our institution.
METHODS: We collected clinical and epidemiological data about patients and health care workers at our institution who during a 13-day period had a potential unprotected exposure to 2 patients whose signs and symptoms were subsequently identified as meeting the case definition for probable SARS. The index case at our hospital was a patient who was transferred to our intensive care unit (ICU) from a referral hospital on Mar. 16, 2003, where he had been in close proximity to the son of the individual with the first reported case of SARS in Toronto. After 13 days in the ICU, a diagnosis of probable SARS was reached for our index case. Immediately upon diagnosis of our index case, respiratory isolation and barrier precautions were instituted throughout our hospital and maintained for a period of 10 days, which is the estimated maximum incubation period reported for this disease. Aggressive surveillance measures among hospital staff, patients and visitors were also maintained during this time.
RESULTS: During the surveillance period, 15 individuals (10 hospital staff, 3 patients and 2 visitors) were identified as meeting the case definition for probable or suspected SARS, in addition to our index case. All but 1 individual had had direct contact with a symptomatic patient with SARS during the period of unprotected exposure. No additional cases were identified after infection control precautions had been implemented for 8 days. No cases of secondary transmission were identified in the 21 days following the implementation of these precautions at our institution.
INTERPRETATION: SARS can easily be spread by direct personal contact in the hospital setting. We found that the implementation of aggressive infection control measures is effective in preventing further transmission of this disease.

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Mesh:

Year:  2003        PMID: 12771070      PMCID: PMC155957     

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  CMAJ        ISSN: 0820-3946            Impact factor:   8.262


  2 in total

1.  Global surveillance for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).

Authors: 
Journal:  Wkly Epidemiol Rec       Date:  2003-04-04

2.  The immediate psychological and occupational impact of the 2003 SARS outbreak in a teaching hospital.

Authors:  Robert Maunder; Jonathan Hunter; Leslie Vincent; Jocelyn Bennett; Nathalie Peladeau; Molyn Leszcz; Joel Sadavoy; Lieve M Verhaeghe; Rosalie Steinberg; Tony Mazzulli
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2003-05-13       Impact factor: 8.262

  2 in total
  75 in total

Review 1.  SARS: prudence, not panic.

Authors:  Richard Schabas
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2003-05-27       Impact factor: 8.262

2.  Lessons from SARS.

Authors: 
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2003-05-27       Impact factor: 8.262

Review 3.  Antiviral treatment of SARS: can we draw any conclusions?

Authors:  Getu Zhaori
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2003-11-25       Impact factor: 8.262

4.  Interpretation of diagnostic laboratory tests for severe acute respiratory syndrome: the Toronto experience.

Authors:  Patrick Tang; Marie Louie; Susan E Richardson; Marek Smieja; Andrew E Simor; Frances Jamieson; Margaret Fearon; Susan M Poutanen; Tony Mazzulli; Raymond Tellier; James Mahony; Mark Loeb; Astrid Petrich; Max Chernesky; Allison McGeer; Donald E Low; Elizabeth Phillips; Steven Jones; Nathalie Bastien; Yan Li; Daryl Dick; Allen Grolla; Lisa Fernando; Timothy F Booth; Bonnie Henry; Anita R Rachlis; Larissa M Matukas; David B Rose; Reena Lovinsky; Sharon Walmsley; Wayne L Gold; Sigmund Krajden
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2004-01-06       Impact factor: 8.262

5.  Scientific publishing picks up speed.

Authors: 
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2003-06-24       Impact factor: 8.262

6.  Modelling strategies for controlling SARS outbreaks.

Authors:  Abba B Gumel; Shigui Ruan; Troy Day; James Watmough; Fred Brauer; P van den Driessche; Dave Gabrielson; Chris Bowman; Murray E Alexander; Sten Ardal; Jianhong Wu; Beni M Sahai
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2004-11-07       Impact factor: 5.349

7.  Appropriate use of personal protective equipment among healthcare workers in public sector hospitals and primary healthcare polyclinics during the SARS outbreak in Singapore.

Authors:  S E Chia; D Koh; C Fones; F Qian; V Ng; B H Tan; K S Wong; W M Chew; H K Tang; W Ng; Z Muttakin; S Emmanuel; N P Fong; G Koh; M K Lim
Journal:  Occup Environ Med       Date:  2005-07       Impact factor: 4.402

8.  The SARS outbreak in a general hospital in Tianjin, China -- the case of super-spreader.

Authors:  Sh X Wang; Y M Li; B C Sun; S W Zhang; W H Zhao; M T Wei; K X Chen; X L Zhao; Z L Zhang; M Krahn; A C Cheung; P P Wang
Journal:  Epidemiol Infect       Date:  2005-12-22       Impact factor: 2.451

9.  Is the Quarantine Act relevant?

Authors:  Richard Schabas
Journal:  CMAJ       Date:  2007-06-19       Impact factor: 8.262

10.  Severe acute respiratory syndrome: Did quarantine help?

Authors:  Richard Schabas
Journal:  Can J Infect Dis Med Microbiol       Date:  2004-07       Impact factor: 2.471

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