| Literature DB >> 12412887 |
Forest Baker1, Howard Rachlin.
Abstract
Pigeons played a repeated prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that reflected theirchoices: If a pigeon cooperated on trial n, the computer cooperated on trial n + 1; if the pigeon defected on trial n, the computer defected on trial n + 1. Cooperation thus maximized reinforcement in the long term, but defection was worth more on the current trial. Under these circumstances, pigeons normally defect. However, when a signal correlated with the pigeon's previous choice immediately followed each current trial choice, some pigeons learned to cooperate. Furthermore, cooperation was higher when trials were close together in time than when they were separated by long intertrial intervals.Mesh:
Year: 2002 PMID: 12412887 DOI: 10.3758/bf03196303
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Psychon Bull Rev ISSN: 1069-9384