Literature DB >> 10891296

Partitive Formulation of Information in Probabilistic Problems: Beyond Heuristics and Frequency Format Explanations.

.   

Abstract

I propose a simple theory on the use of base rate according to which neither heuristic nor frequentist factors underlie demonstrations of the occurrence or the elimination of the base-rate fallacy. According to this view, what is crucial for the occurrence or elimination of the base-rate fallacy is the absence or presence, respectively, of what can be called a partitive formulation (Macchi, 1995) of the conditional likelihood datum. A partitive formulation defines the set of which the numerical datum is a part (in terms of percentages or frequencies) by referring to the likelihood datum relative to the base rate information. The predictive power of this hypothesis is shown by comparing responses to different versions of problems containing the same implied natural heuristic principles and supplied data, but which differ in the way the information is presented (partitive vs nonpartitive). Whether probabilistic or frequentist, the partitive versions lead to an almost complete elimination of the bias which remains when nonpartitive versions are used. On the basis of these experimental results, the paper includes a critical discussion of heuristic, frequentist, and mental models theories. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.

Year:  2000        PMID: 10891296     DOI: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2895

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Organ Behav Hum Decis Process        ISSN: 0749-5978


  9 in total

1.  Use of base rates and case cue information in making likelihood estimates.

Authors:  Stephanie Stolarz-Fantino; Edmund Fantino; Nicholas Van Borst
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2006-04

2.  Which cognitive individual differences predict good Bayesian reasoning? Concurrent comparisons of underlying abilities.

Authors:  Gary Brase
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2021-02

3.  What facilitates Bayesian reasoning? A crucial test of ecological rationality versus nested sets hypotheses.

Authors:  Gary Brase
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2021-04

4.  The inverse fallacy: an account of deviations from Bayes's theorem and the additivity principle.

Authors:  Gaëlle Villejoubert; David R Mandel
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2002-03

5.  Whose statistical reasoning is facilitated by a causal structure intervention?

Authors:  Simon McNair; Aidan Feeney
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2015-02

6.  Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!

Authors:  Jean Baratgin; Marion Dubois-Sage; Baptiste Jacquet; Jean-Louis Stilgenbauer; Frank Jamet
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2020-11-23

7.  Tversky and Kahneman's Cognitive Illusions: Who Can Solve Them, and Why?

Authors:  Georg Bruckmaier; Stefan Krauss; Karin Binder; Sven Hilbert; Martin Brunner
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2021-04-12

8.  How the Custom Suppresses the Endowment Effect: Exchange Paradigm in Kanak Country.

Authors:  Jean Baratgin; Patrice Godin; Frank Jamet
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2022-01-25

9.  Reference Dependence in Bayesian Reasoning: Value Selection Bias, Congruence Effects, and Response Prompt Sensitivity.

Authors:  Alaina Talboy; Sandra Schneider
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2022-03-17
  9 in total

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.