Literature DB >> 10281607

Price elasticity and adverse selection in the demand for supplementary health insurance.

M S Marquis, C E Phelps.   

Abstract

Probit regression estimates show the effects of the price of insurance, anticipated medical expenditures, and other factors on reported decisions about purchasing hypothetically offered supplementary insurance policies. The demand estimates can characterize how much supplemental insurance would be purchased under different tax policies affecting health insurance purchases. Although eliminating the current tax subsidy to insurance is shown to decrease demand, the results indicate a substantial demand for supplementary insurance even in the absence of present tax incentives. However, our results on adverse selection raise concerns about the potential stability of supplemental insurance markets.

Mesh:

Year:  1987        PMID: 10281607     DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00741.x

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Econ Inq        ISSN: 0095-2583


  7 in total

1.  The role of product design in consumers' choices in the individual insurance market.

Authors:  M Susan Marquis; Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin; José J Escarce; Kanika Kapur
Journal:  Health Serv Res       Date:  2007-12       Impact factor: 3.402

2.  The enigma of higher income immigrants with lower rates of health insurance coverage in the United States.

Authors:  Elizabeth Bass
Journal:  J Immigr Minor Health       Date:  2006-01

3.  A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?

Authors:  K P M van Winssen; R C van Kleef; W P M M van de Ven
Journal:  Eur J Health Econ       Date:  2016-02-09

4.  Evidence of adverse selection in Iranian supplementary health insurance market.

Authors:  Gh Mahdavi; Z Izadi
Journal:  Iran J Public Health       Date:  2012-07-31       Impact factor: 1.429

5.  Impact of external price referencing on medicine prices - a price comparison among 14 European countries.

Authors:  Christine Leopold; Aukje Katja Mantel-Teeuwisse; Leonhard Seyfang; Sabine Vogler; Kees de Joncheere; Richard Ogilvie Laing; Hubert Leufkens
Journal:  South Med Rev       Date:  2012-12-27

6.  Asymmetric Information in Iranian's Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.

Authors:  Farhad Lotfi; Hassan Abolghasem Gorji; Ghadir Mahdavi; Mohammad Hadian
Journal:  Glob J Health Sci       Date:  2015-04-19

7.  Can premium differentiation counteract adverse selection in the Dutch supplementary health insurance? A simulation study.

Authors:  K P M van Winssen; R C van Kleef; W P M M van de Ven
Journal:  Eur J Health Econ       Date:  2017-07-31
  7 in total

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